The invention of "artificial perspective" revealed the ideal character of Euclidean geometry already in the Renaissance Europe of the fifteenth century. To the extent to which it made painting a "science" relying on mathematical rules, it made mathematics an "art" independent of the "geometry of nature." It was the artistic vision emerging from perspective drawing that paved the way for scientific abstraction. However, it was only in the nineteenth century that the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry compelled mathematics to ponder the visual evidence of its principles and the reliability of its abstract concepts. At that time, it was the mathematical vision that first championed the rights of ideal forms to a higher level of abstraction and, therefore, oriented science and art towards new representational spaces.
When I came across Joseph Needham's question1 -"What was it that happened in Renaissance Europe when mathematics and science joined in a combination that was qualitatively new and destined to transform the world?" -I could not help thinking of Brunelleschi and Leonardo. The "exact fantasy" of the design for the cupola of Santa Maria del Fiore together with the grace that emanates from The Virgin and Child with Saint Anne immediately came to my mind. Is there an answer here? Ernst Cassirer's philosophical reflection helped me focus on the issue of abstraction, whereas David Hilbert's vision of geometry helped me grasp the ideality of mathematics and art.
The Painters' Science and the Geometry of Nature
De pictura (1436), the first treatise on linear perspective, written by Leon Battista Alberti, is dedicated to the architect Filippo Brunelleschi. In the dedicatory letter, Alberti described Filippo's enterprise as a feat of engineering unimaginable even among the ancients, an astonishing example of what could be achieved by arts and sciences: "an enormous construction towering above the skies, vast enough to cover the entire Tuscan population with its shadow, and done without the aid of beams or elaborate wooden supports."2 The Brunelleschi's procedure is mentioned again by Alberti, in his De re aedificatoria (1485), to emphasize the independence of lineamentum, which appears likely to be interpreted as the ideal path from the plan to the actual construction, from any material content (omnia materia seclusa). To draw a set of buildings from the same lineamentum, a rational strategy must guide the enterprise. A sort of "principle of continuity" encouraged Alberti to use a particular case, such as that of the octagonal form of the Brunelleschi's cupola, as a stepping stone to a general type. Going backward from the actual building to its design, the "master builder" aimed for the reasons that made that particular solution sound, hence for the general rule to be applied to other cases.
In contrast with the architect, whose drawings come alive in three dimensions, the painter projects from three to two dimensions. In contrast with the mathematician, who measures "the shapes and forms of things in the mind alone and divorced entirely from matter," the painter "strives to represent only the things that are seen."3 Taking from mathematics what is relevant to the subject, Alberti built the art of painting on "the basic principles of nature." The first issue was the geometrical construction of the pictorial space. "A painting will be the intersection of a visual pyramid at a given distance, with a fixed centre and certain position of lights, represented by art with lines and colours on a given surface."4 Once the painter's eye has acquired the pertinent features of surfaces and intersection, it is his hand that needs instructions to represent them. A veil divided by fine threads into a convenient number of parallel square sections may help apply the theory of proportions. Set up as an intersection of the visual pyramid, the veil allows the painter to measure the lengths on the scene, and to map them on the picture plane. His drawing will provide an image "indistinguishable" from the one framed by an open window or reflected by a mirror.5 In short, Alberti's treatise drives the painter to arrange harmonious proportions within a representation space by projecting every point of the scene into the pictorial space from his "point of view." Brunelleschi's original, empirical method was turned into a "logically coherent" handbook for painters. 6 A distinct character of Renaissance culture was the emergence of special kinds of affinity between logical and observational concerns in the visual arts and sciences, primarily in painting and mathematics. Those concerns centred upon the issue of "coherence," as the link between vision and certitude quivered, and lighted upon the products of those disciplines as "ideal constructions." Artistic and scientific representation urged to investigate the conditions and procedures according to which the rules governing the activity of nature and of human beings were to be understood. It is in this scenario that an enquiry into structural and intellectual ties between the painters' and the mathematicians' art finds its motives. When philosophy was still fastened to a concept of natural law grounded on ontology and algebra still subordinate to Euclidean geometry, the theory of art redefined the problem of knowledge overtaking the canons of the late Scholastic thought.7 The question is not whether artists were able to draw mathematical forms from nature, and consequently to perform as scientists, but rather how the theory of art was able to elude the logical and ontological constraints of the past tradition and pave the way for modern science. The perspective method allowed the painter to grasp the "intelligence" of nature, and give shape to coherent forms accordingly. By reading the reasons of nature through the geometry of an art:8 "the mind of the painter must transmute itself into the very mind of nature and be the interpreter between it and art."9 The painters' artificial perspective was not solely a technique of drawing. To the extent to which it made painting a science, which relies on mathematical rules, it made mathematics an art independent of the geometry of nature. At the crossroads of art and mathematics, perspective drawing achieved one main goal, namely, to activate a productive imagination vital to both. The artificial character of Renaissance mathematics, however, was primarily related to the kinship of techne and episteme and was slowly identified with the "practical application" of skilful methods. At that moment, a new kind of "symbolgenerating abstraction" paved the way for modern algebra.10
Strengths and weaknesses of a mathematics geometrically oriented emerge from the history of the negative square roots, i.e., the imaginary components of "complex numbers," striving to enter the pantheon of mathematical objects. Girolamo Cardano's Ars Magna (1545) is famed for making public a general solution to cubic equations. Following the Euclidean methods, Cardano demonstrated the "formula" by mapping the constituent parts of a cubic into solid figures. His proof, however, did not work for the so-called "irreducible case," which involved negative square roots. There is no way of drawing a line as a side of a square that has a negative area. Despite various attempts to attribute a meaning to those sophistic roots, neither Cardano nor other mathematicians managed to come to terms with them.11 In the shadow of geometry, it seemed 8 For a detailed historical survey of the theory of perspective from Alberti to Monge, see Kirsti Andersen, The Geometry of an Art (New York: Springer, 2007). 9
Leonardo da Vinci, Trattato della Pittura (Codice Vaticano Urbinate 1270) I, 24v. 10 The impact of "modern algebra" on the traditional mathematical sciences, in the 16th century, is carefully considered by Jacob Klein. As he explains, the mathematical disciplines traditionally belonged among the artes liberales, intended as theoretical disciplines in contrast to the practical artes mechanicae. Arithmetic, however, maintained close links with the "art of calculation," for its "logistic" elements provided the theoretical foundations for "practical" calculations. See Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), 125. 11 In fact, the formula is credited to Scipione Del Ferro as well as to Niccolò Tartaglia, who handed it to Cardano.
foolish to venture into "mental tortures" such as those brought about by negative square roots. But those tortures would sophisticate geometry itself.12 It was an engineer, Rafael Bombelli, who hailed the negative square roots as a new kind of numbers and equipped them with the appropriate rules. His Algebra (1572) provided real solutions to cubic equations, even when the irreducible case occurs, through a demonstration on a plane surface. By disentangling algebra from geometry, cubic equations could be accommodated in two dimensions. Bombelli's work can be traced to the abacus masters of the thirteenth century. It is worth noticing that the "scientific" character of this practical branch of mathematics worked its way through Diophantus' Arithmetic.13 Indeed, after studying and translating Diophantus' work, Bombelli revised his manuscript; the "geometric algebra" of Diophantus made clear the abstract character of his algebra. Yet the powerful algebra of Bombelli hibernated for a long time.
Interestingly, Cardano's attitude towards the "sophistic roots" may attest a zestful mixture of epistemological concerns in Renaissance thought. Like other mathematicians, he could not see the side of a negative square. Those roots, as he wrote, were "as subtilis as inutilis"; useless for the mathematician but subtle, presumably, for the philosopher and the "gambling scholar."14 Indeed, his De subtilitate, a major philosophical treatise on the fabric of nature, regards painting as better equipped than geometry to capture what dwells in shadow. Painting can render not only the object, but also "the affections of the object"; by making visible what is lighted as well as what is shadowed, it expresses "judgments." For Cardano, it was the "subtlest art."15 Eventually, the geometer was just a mathematician, whereas the painter was also a "sapient": an anatomist, an architect and a visionary. Thinking of such a special figure, Cardano pointed at Leonardo. Sfumato (nuanced) is the characteristic, pictorial means used by Leonardo to render the fabric of nature. More than a way of seeing forms and relating them to one another, the sfumato is also the carrier of an attitude towards The result is a perfect synthesis between natural and divine; an image in which "synthetic instant" and eternity are held in suspension,20 an image of Leonardo's comprehension of the sacred alliance between the finite and the infinite.
The Fabric of Infinity
Coming from the Orient, the religious intuition of the infinite took hold of the Greek soul. Neither Pythagoras nor Archimedes, however, accepted that passive contemplation of the infinity that seems peculiar to the Orient. "It is the great achievement of the Greeks to have made the contrast between the finite and the infinite fruitful for cognition of reality."21 The theory of proportions and the method of exhaustion are the gates of infinity in ancient times. Infinity was understood as the possibility of the indefinite continuation of a process. But the possibility of eventual "completion" was not at issue;22 the Greeks were afraid of the void, hence of the infinite. It was the rationale behind the Christian religion that bestowed a "Hilbertian flavour" on the question of infinity. In the medieval Europe, the conflict between truths of faith and truths of reason urged Christian philosophy to look to geometric optics for enlightenment. If faith could not be divorced from reason, observation and Revelation needed to entrust a common language. The language came from the science of light. Light was seen as the analogous of the divine grace, and was ruled by geometric optics. As long as the lawfulness of nature revealed the divine design, Euclidean geometry could help refine both observation of nature and comprehension of God. Consequently, for the Franciscan philosophers of Oxford, the study of ray propagation and of the mechanism of vision was essential to a thorough investigation of natural phenomena. Four centuries before Galileo, Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, wrote that without considering lineis, angulis et figuris the natural philosophy would be incomprehensible. By connecting the Platonic doctrines of light to the Aristotelian logic, Grosseteste saw the generation of natural forms determined by the different "modes" in which light acts. Even though the rationale behind the medieval optics (natural perspective) was Aristotelian, the conception of perspective as a "demonstrative science" handed over a mathematical language to natural philosophy.23 From the science of light, the way led to modern science of nature. How did it encounter the painters' science?
The idea of a "mathematical" design of nature took hold of the Renaissance scientist. Approaching the study of nature as a mathematician, "he sought and expected to find broad, profound, immutable, rational principles either through intuition or immediate sense perception, in much the same way as Euclid presumably found his axioms."24 For Morris Kline, "the Renaissance scientist was a theologian with nature instead of God as his subject." Indeed mathematical truth could not be obscured, and its light flowed from the divine to human intellect:
It is true that the divine intellect cognizes the mathematical truths in infinitely greater plenitude than does our own (for it knows them all), but of the few that the human intellect may grasp, I believe that cognition equals that of the divine intellect as regards objective certainty, since man attains the insight into their necessity, beyond which there can be no higher degree of certainty.25
Neither a Leonardo nor a Piero della Francesca, however, seem inclined to bless the marriage between the faith in mathematical truth and the evidence of objective certainty.
Visually speaking, Erwin Panofsky recognizes the emergence of "modern" perspective where "the northern Gothic feeling for space, strengthened in architecture and especially sculpture, seizes upon the architectural and landscape forms preserved in fragments in Byzantine painting, and welds them into a new unity."26 And the founders of the modern perspectival view of space, as he remarks, were Giotto and Duccio, the two painters whose styles completed the grand synthesis of Gothic and Byzantine. Martin Kemp notices the sense of the eyewitness character of Giotto's scenes. They reflect the desire, in a particularly Franciscan spirit, to present the sacred narratives in human terms, relating the individual experience of the spectator to the reality of the great events.27 Along this path, it may appear reasonable to regard the Brunelleschi- represented how the world looks through a human lens. Both daily life and "great events" became commensurable to human beings who could henceforth accommodate any representations of their point of view. In fact, by breaking the code of nature, if the scientist would become a theologian, the painter took to a different road.
A speculative attitude towards contents encourages us to read paintings such as Saint Augustine in His Studio (c. 1480) or The Vision of Saint Augustine (1487) by Sandro Botticelli as assessing the impossibility of mediating between reason and faith. In the former, the image of Saint Augustine illuminated by a light ray coming from the infinity -namely, from the upper left side of the painting -stands against a background showing Euclid's Elements, opened on a shelf, together with other scientific instruments "as subtle as useless." In the latter, an intrepid child is endeavouring to gather the sea water into a hole dug in sand; facing Saint Augustine, he explains that his goal is less difficult than the perception of the Trinity.28
At the same time, however, the link between the mathematics of infinity and the perception of God was brought about by Nicholas of Cusa. In his work De docta ignorantia (1440), he argued that the absolute and infinite, the One, lies beyond every possibility of separation and measurement, i.e., every possibility of reducing one thing to another through a finite series of steps; therefore, it is beyond human knowledge. Finiti et infiniti nulla proportio.29 As both "a speculative theologian" and a "speculative mathematician," he realized that the Aristotelian logic could not help Scholasticism think the absolute and infinite; that logic, which rests on the principle of the excluded third, is a logic of the finite. "It must always and of necessity break down where the perception of the infinite is in question."30 Any rational theology seems to give way to "mystical theology." By contrast, Cusanus explained that true love of God is amor Dei intellectualis -for love without knowledge is impossible -and that such love is only accessible through the "intellectual vision" (visio intellectualis). The point at issue is that, in order to clarify how the visio intellectualis affects human 28 See Martin Kemp, "The Taking and Use of Evidence; with a Botticelli Case Study,"
Art Journal (1984): 44-43. 29 The passage continues as follows: "Because it is evident that between the infinite and the finite no relationship exists, it is also completely clear that wherever there is something that surpasses and something that is surpassed, one can never attain the absolute Maximum, for that which surpasses, like that which is surpassed, is finite, whereas the absolute Maximum is necessarily infinite. If, therefore, there is something which is not the absolute Maximum, something greater can obviously always be found." (D. ign. I.9). 30 Weyl, Mind-Nature, 39.
understanding, Cusanus did not rely on a mystical form of passive contemplation, but rather on mathematics and its "symbolic figures" (D. ign. I.33-34).
Cusanus made clear that the symbols overshadow the logic of the finite. A symbol can point to the absolute because it is not simply an image, which depends on a quantitative relation (ratio). To see how a line equals a triangle, the intellect ought to transcend perception because line and triangle are not related by proportion. As Cusanus noticed, "the sum of the length of any two sides of a triangle is always greater than the length of the remaining side, though this sum decreases and approaches the length of the third side when the angle that is formed by those two sides itself increases."31 Conversely, when this angle increases, the sum of the lengths of the two sides decreases. It follows that when the angle equals two right angles, the triangle becomes a line. This shows that what is necessary for non-quantitative figures is impossible for the quantitative ones (D. ign. I.37-38).32 For Cusanus, knowledge required both "separation" and "participation," as the one can only be thought in relation to the other:
By denying any overlapping of the two realms and by teaching us to see the One in the other, and the other in the One, the separation itself guarantees the possibility of true participation of the sensible in the ideal.33 Similar to Augustine, Cusanus' search for a more profound understanding of God focused upon the Trinity. Similar to Hilbert, his goal was a comprehensive "vision" of the infinite with finite -i.e., human -means. By investigating the difference between line and triangle, Cusanus' view of the Trinity has also sharpened the meaning of line and angle. In mathematical terms, the Trinity is a regular triangle, with no differences between its sides and its angles. Letting one angle increase and become straight, Cusanus saw the triangle "contracted" into the line. Measurement, of course, would prove the argument to be wrong. Vision, however, allowed the triangle to guard its figure even when two of its angles increase and become right, while the other vanishes (like painting would show to projective geometry). The subtle affinity between theological and mathematical concerns about the infinite may be captured in the contrast For the truth is absolute necessity which can never be more nor less than it is; whereas our intellect is only possibility" (D. ign. I.10). 33 Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos, [23] [24] between ratio, meaning perception and measure, and visio intellectualis, to be read as "ideal view." Bridging the gulf between the infinite and the finite has been as challenging for theology as for mathematics. Hilbert's proof theory has been likely the most daring attempt to meet the challenge. In theological terms, the gulf surrounds the crucial mystery of the Incarnation of Christ. Yearning for the impossible, Renaissance painters sought a way through.34
The painter was neither a "speculative theologian" nor a "speculative mathematician." Presenting believers with the astonishment of a pretty girl facing her odd destiny, paintings could be much more eloquent than words. Even friar painters, such as Fra Angelico or Fra Filippo Lippi, did not approach the subject of the Annunciation theoretically, but rather visually and with simplicity.35 Nevertheless, the delicacy of the message required a suitable channel from the angel to the Virgin; a ray, a shadow, a column could do. But the Renaissance painter was primarily an artist, eager to play with rules, and often a mathematician familiar with measures and proportions. In tune with Cusanus' conceptual argument, the "painter" Piero della Francesca deliberately broke the rules of perspective to convey the meaning of the Annunciation.36 In his Perugia Annunciation (1470), a perspective paradox, intriguingly reminiscent of more recent analogous examples by the graphic artist Maurits Cornelis Escher, contrasts with extraordinary command the sensible vision with the geo metric logic.37
However insightful all these findings may be, the lesson to be drawn from the dialog between mathematics and visual arts in Renaissance Europe does not lie in the natural representation of the sacred scene, nor in the symbolic presentation of contents, but in the "structural definition" of ideal forms. It is against the background of the ideal view that the marriage between the finite and the infinite stands and becomes visible (Figure 2 ).
Ideal Views: From Alberti to Hilbert
Alberti presented his De pictura as a treatise for painters like himself. Mathematics, he claimed, is mental, while painting takes on action: it shows what is no longer there, and what may come. In either case, it moves mind: from present to past (memory), or from present to future (prevision). Effectiveness and correctness of the picture is to be measured by comparing the real image, which is present, with the absent model, which is represented or prefigured.
Alberti's model, however, was neither in the past nor in the future; it was the real cupola of the great Filippo that let his visio intellectualis develop. "Which algorithm has driven the architect from the screen of his fantasia to the real scene?" That cupola "towering above the skies" did not cast any doubt upon its consistency. Therefore, Alberti first took a picture of the cupola, i.e., projected the three-dimensional model on the picture plane, then went his way from the picture to the ideal building. The process is reversible: moving one image to fit on the other equals reflecting the one in the other. The ideal bridge connecting the two images grows out of the looking glass. And the art of building, for Alberti, grows out of painting, which is the flower of all the arts:
Painting was honoured by our ancestors with the special distinction that, whereas all other artists were called craftsmen, the painter alone was not counted among their number. Consequently I used to tell my friends that the inventor of painting, according to the poets, was Narcissus, who was turned into a flower; for, as painting is the flower of all the arts, so the tale of Narcissus fits our purpose perfectly.
What is painting but the act of embracing by means of art the surface of the pool?38
Incidentally, let the flower be a lotus instead of a narcissus, and the moral of Narcissus' metamorphosis changes accordingly. The admiration of one's appearance (bella figura), which is peculiar to the West, is turned into the illumination that comes from the knowledge of oneself. Although the latter comes from the Orient, it fits one side of Alberti's view much better. On the other side, whereas Alberti's De pictura instructs the painter, his De re aedificatoria guides the architect to map the picture into an ideal, built landscape to chart its nodes and move through them. As he remarked, the desire and thought of building are "congenial to our minds":
It often happens that we ourselves, although busy with completely different things, cannot prevent our minds and imagination from projecting some building or other. Or again, when we see some other person's building, we immediately look over and compare the individual dimensions, and to the best of our ability consider what might be taken away, added, or altered, to make it more elegant, and willingly we lend our advice.39
The best evidence of the ideal matrix out of which Alberti moulds his work comes from three Ideal Cities depicted in the early 1470s (Figure 3) . The three painted panels whose attribution is uncertain among some artists of central Italy represent architectural scenes that may notably be interpreted both as site-specific projects and as stage sets.40 Richard Krautheimer observes that "[a]ll the three create -as it was out of magic -an artificial world in which the spectator is forced to enter, a world beyond the reality of daily life."41 In those years, Piero della Francesca -who may be hazarded as one of the authors of the Ideal Cities -wrote his De Prospectiva pingendi (c. 1474), which refined the "mathematical foundations" of the Albertian geometry of vision.42 And some years later he wrote his Libellus de quinque corporibus regularibus, a treatise on the five regular solids which would be incorporated in Luca Pacioli's De divina proportione (1509) and illustrated by Leonardo. Piero was a remarkable mathematician and his Libellus was intended to reconcile the Euclidean geometry of nature with practical mathematics of perspective drawing. He addressed the questions posed by the geometry of solids with the methods of his Trattato d'abaco and tried to find solutions by means of arithmetic and algebra. Leaving aside any mystical or philosophical considerations related to a Platonic realm of forms, he considered those questions as a "craftsman." Accordingly, he used numbers and roots as measures of lines and angles and let perspective lead him to recognize the relevant projections. Thus the set of the five Platonic solids -"as many and sufficient as required by Nature" -could be enriched with numberless "generable" polyhedra and treated as a subset of the set of generable polyhedra. Grasping their symmetry, Leonardo's hand made visible all of them:
[The eye] triumphs over nature, in that the constituent parts of nature are finite, but the works which the eye commands of the hands are infinite, as is demonstrated by the painter in his rendering of numberless forms.43
The geometric solids studied by Piero della Francesca and devised by Leonardo are invariant under certain rotations in three dimensions, or, in more technical terms, are invariant under a subgroup of the special orthogonal group.44 For both Piero and Leonardo, the point at issue was to figure out the rotation symmetries of the regular solids in two dimensions, that is to say, to project the regular rotations of plastic forms into the picture plane. It is ironic that those symmetries, which seem to acquire their consistency from Leonardo's hand, grow out of complex numbers. Most mathematicians of the sixteenth century, however, were not ready to react to the artistic vision.
Which "artistic vision" is at issue? Two distinct visions of art participate in the painter's representation: "abstract vision" which is made by "artificial perspective" (prospectiva pingendi) and consists of the painter's projection of forms on a plane which is itself liable to foreshortening;45 and "pure vision" which consists of "natural perspective" and draws its consistency from the truth of geometry. Alberti's vision of painting as an art, separated from crafts, seems not Piero's. And Leonardo's vision of painting as a science seems not Piero's either. "His competence as a mathematician, no less than his skill as a painter, stood in the way of his regarding his craft as an art."46 To Piero's eye, both algebra and artificial perspective remained less reliable than Euclidean geometry; they could not be believed as "true." Then, in the sixteenth century, the ways of painting and mathematics began to diverge; painters were inclined to release their representation from the constraints of the "science of sight"; mathematicians increasingly raised the status of algebra towards that of geometry.47 In the frame of Descartes' Geometry (1637), it may be conjectured that Piero would have finally taken himself seriously as a mathematician. By contrast, neither Alberti's nor Leonardo's art of painting fits with the Cartesian science.
45 See Kemp, Science-Art, 49. 46 Field, Piero, 294. 47 One may also conjecture that the divina proporzione between painting and mathematics faded away as a side effect of the "scientific revolution." Painting went its own ways to the "artistic representation"; the visual and abstract ways of mathematics proceeded toward the "scientific representation" of Descartes and Newton's science. Once numbers were assigned to geometrical points by Descartes and mathematics was "naturalized" by Newton, the mechanical architecture of the physical world replaced Alberti's ideal architecture. 
Almost four centuries separate De divina proportione (1509) from the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris (1900) where Hilbert said:
While insisting on rigour in the proof as a requirement for a perfect solution of a problem, I should like, on the other hand, to oppose the opinion that only the concepts of analysis, or even those of arithmetic alone, are susceptible of a fully rigorous treatment. . . . Such a one-sided interpretation of the requirement of rigour would soon lead to the ignoring of all concepts arising from geometry, mechanics, and physics, to a stoppage of the flow of new material from the outside world, and finally, indeed, as a last consequence, to the rejection of the ideas of the continuum and of the irrational number.48
Whereas his conception of mathematics as an "open science" appears ultimate Albertian, his concerns about geometry would have baffled Piero della Francesca or Cardano. Arithmetic concepts had become the paradigm of mathematical rigour, while geometry had lost its primacy and looked to number theory for its consistency. What had happened?
Mathematics had taken a further step towards abstraction: "The character of this distinctly modern mathematics is indicated by its use of abstract concepts. Such concepts do not exclusively apply to privileged object like numbers or geometrical magnitudes; rather, they are introduced through structural definitions and apply to many different classes of objects with appropriate relational connections. This transformation took place in the second half of the nineteenth century and is reflected in Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie."49 What transformation had affected mathematics?
Visual Geometry and Ideal Forms
In the nineteenth century the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry proved that neither could geometry draw its consistency from "natural truth," nor could the primacy of Leonardo's continuous quantities stem from the geometry of nature. At that point mathematics recognized that a "continuity principle" was missing.
Indeed the ideal character of geometry stems from perspective drawing. After Alberti's and Piero's treatises on painting, the first rigourous mathematical account of the painters' perspective was Girard Desargues's Brouillon project (1637). The "light rays" were replaced with a family of lines through a point (the "eye"), and Alberti's veil became a projective plane. Challenging the fifth Euclidean axiom, parallels met: the "vanishing points" were filled by the points at infinity. Lengths and angles were not preserved by projection. The relevant invariant was the cross-ratio, namely a ratio of ratios of lengths. But, like Bombelli's Algebra, Desargues' Brouillon project would lay dormant for more than two centuries,50 whereas the developments of algebra, analytic geometry and calculus sank the interest in this branch of geometry.
It was the Gaspard Monge's school of mathematics that claimed projective geometry a special branch of geometry and further explored it. While Monge's "descriptive geometry" used the parallel projection, which may be traced to the perspective drawings of Chinese and Japanese artists (Figure 4, left) , Jean-Victor Poncelet used the Albertian central projection.51 He entrusted a "continuity principle" to provide geometry with the generality of the analytic methods of algebra. Once established for a given case of a particular figure, a "general theorem" ought to remain valid even when some elements of the figure become imaginary. Taken as intuitively evident, the principle of continuity seemed not in need of proof. As to the "imaginary elements," after reading Euclid in the light of Pappus and Proclus, Michel Chasles explained that they are parts which "are not there" in a given state of a figure,52 though they are "real" in another state of the figure. Accordingly, to think of imaginary quantities means to think of their corresponding real states. It was Christian von Staudt, in his Geometrie der Lage (1847), who recognized projective geometry as more fundamental than Euclidean geometry for it was not constrained by lengths. Out of mathematics' magic, the rules of algebra were drawn from projective theorems, and the geometry of a projective plane was tied to the algebra of the corresponding "hypercomplex" number system.53 Last but surely not least, Felix Klein connected projective and nonEuclidean geometry and showed that "a model of non-Euclidean geometry ensures that the non-Euclidean parallel hypothesis is not contradictory."54 In his Erlangen address (1872), he presented geometry as the study of transformation groups and their invariants. Here, the natural truth of Euclidean geometry disappeared.
Both Klein's Erlangen Programm and Richard Dedekind's essay on Continuity and Irrational Numbers date 1872. In the former, the ideal transformations of visual forms reveal the rules of the game behind. In the latter, the symmetry of ideal mirrors reveals the essence of continuity.
Looking for Continuity
The problem of the emergence and use of more and more abstract mathematical concepts was a main concern of the mathematical reflection in the second half of the nineteenth century. The distinctive abstractness of mathematical concepts has stimulated not solely Hilbert's methodological sensibility, but also Ernst Cassirer's. Through an attentive reflection inspired by Hermann Lotze and Dedekind, Cassirer focuses on the limits of the Aristotle's abstraction theory, and clarifies that abstraction does not consist of selecting certain properties, shared by a plurality of things, and ignoring the remaining ones. The negation involved must drive the emergence of the relevant connecting structure; the "structural form" that comes to light can be recognized, in its "purity," only after the relation from which it develops has been grasped. In Dedekind's words:
If in the consideration of a simply infinite system N ordered by a mapping f we entirely neglect the special character of the elements, simply retaining their distinguishability and taking into account only the relation to one another in which they are placed by the ordering mapping f, then these elements are called natural numbers or ordinal numbers or simply numbers, and the base element 1 is called the base-number of the number-series N. With reference to this liberation of the elements from every other content (abstraction) we are justified in calling the numbers a free creation of the human mind.55
This passage throws considerable light on the ways of abstraction. Nevertheless, by defending the freedom of creation, it seems that Dedekind slightly overlooked the crucial interplay between "separation" and "participation," which guarantees the freedom of creation itself. Pondering over a precise characteristic of continuity, he hunted for the principle underlying geometric intuition [Anschauung] itself. Considering that every point of the straight line produces "a separation of the same into two portions [Stücke] such that every point of one portion lies to the left of every point of the other," he found the essence of continuity in the converse, i.e., in the following principle:
If all points of the straight line fall into two classes such that every point of the first class [Klasse] lies to the left of every point of the second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two portions.56
This remark allows the continuous domain of real numbers to be drawn from the discontinuous domain of rationals. Indeed any separation, which Dedekind called cut, of the system of rational numbers into two classes in such a way that every number of one class is less than every number of the other defines a real number. Then, the incompleteness or discontinuity of the domain of rational numbers turns out to be the property that not all cuts are produced 55 Richard Dedekind, "Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen", in From Kant to Hilbert, 809. 56 Dedekind, "Continuity and Irrational Numbers," ibid., 771.
by rational numbers.57 These cuts, however, are visible to the mathematician's mind which, whenever a cut is produced by no rational number, creates a new number, an irrational number. Thus, the "axiom of continuity" is not grounded in the intuition of space:
If space has a real existence at all it is not necessarily for it to be continuous; many of its properties would remain the same even if it was discontinuous. And if we knew for certain that space were discontinuous there would be nothing to prevent us, in case we so desired, from filling up its gaps in thought and thus making it continuous; this filling up would consist in a creation of new point-individuals and would have to be carried out in accordance with the above principle.58
But the creation of new point-individuals would stop within a gapless space. If we knew for certain that space were continuous, the absence of gaps (namely its completeness) would prevent us from separating its parts and creating new point-individuals. Like in Cusanus' universe, seeing the triangle in the line requires another dimension, that is to say, another level of abstraction. The separation, which is produced by the gap, guarantees the possibility of participation of the discontinuous in the continuous, of the rational in the real.59 In fact, Dedekind himself decreed the irrational number "as completely defined by the cut," even though did not venture to make a real number out of a gap.60
Hilbert's Ideal Perspective
Hilbert's mathematical concerns centred upon two main issues: to spell out the role of space intuition in geometry, and to prove that mathematics cannot be contradictory. The former led him to refine the axiomatic method, the latter to devise his proof theory. 57 A cut is produced by a rational number when it possesses the property according to which either there exists a greatest number among the numbers of the first class, or else there exists a least number among the numbers of the second class. 58 Ibid., 771-772. 59 See note 31. 60 "By insisting on his right to create a new object to fill each gap," Stillwell remarks, he slightly tarnished the purity and boldness of his idea: "It is perfectly valid, and more economical, to insist that the gap itself is a genuine mathematical object, which we can take to be the pair." See John Stillwell, Roads to Infinity (Natick Mass.: A.K. Peters, 2010), 23n.
The arithmetical symbols are written diagrams and the geometrical figures are graphic formulae; and no mathematician could spare these graphic formulae, any more than in calculation the insertion and removal of parentheses or the use of other analytical signs.61
In his Paris lecture, as mentioned above, Hilbert wished to safeguard the key role of geometry in mathematics, and the use of geometrical signs as a means of strict mathematical proof. At the boundary between logic and observation, geometry set an ideal perspective on methodological questions. Hilbert took geometry as a "branch of physics." His axiomatic system for geometry is built "in such a way that the significance [Be deutung] of the different groups of axioms and the scope [Tragweite] of the consequences, to be derived from individual axioms, come to light clearly"; logic and spatial intuition are separate from the beginning. Each group of axioms captures a peculiar relation between homogeneous elementary facts of our intuition: incidence, order, congruence, parallelism, and continuity. Each axiom captures a single "intuitive" notion. Yet, the axiom-system itself does not represent any visual intuition, or anything factual; as he explained, the geometrical axioms of order and of congruence can be applied to Euclid's points, lines, and planes as much as to beer mugs or little fruit flies.62
The spatial relationships are, as it were, projected into the sphere of the mathematical-abstract in which the structure of their connections appears as an object of pure mathematical thought. This structure is subjected to a mode of investigation that concentrates only on the logical relations and is indifferent to the question of the factual truth, that is, the question whether the geometrical connections determined by the axioms are found in reality (or even in our spatial intuition).63
Once Euclidean geometry turns into Hilbert's axiomatic system, the independence of its axioms, its consistency, and its adequacy as a model of the relevant field of knowledge are to be established through an axiomatic analysis. Questioning spatial intuition, the road took to projective geometry. By investigating the role of Pappus' and Desargues' theorems in Euclid's theory of proportions, Hilbert found a deeper link between geometry and algebra. These theorems capture, respectively, the commutative and associative laws of multiplication; hence, they provided Hilbert with a model of a complete ordered field, i.e., his theory of real numbers. 64 Besides the Archimedean axiom (of measure), in the second edition of his Foundations of Geometry Hilbert added an axiom of completeness, according to which the geometric universe of points, straight lines, and planes is complete, that is, incapable of being extended while continuing to satisfy all the other axioms.65 This axiom, which is not needed to derive any of Euclid's theorems, allowed for projecting the points of the straight line on to real numbers. Hence, it allowed Hilbert to extract the real numbers from geometry.66 As to the consistency of geometry, its proof relied on the consistency of the arithmetic of the system of real numbers. But the theory of numbers itself could not appeal to an analogous method of reduction: nothing but logic can be invoked for its proof of consistency. And the search for a direct proof of consistency led Hilbert to devise his proof theory.
Hilbert presents the general methodological approach in his Copenhagen (and Hamburg) lecture: "The axiomatic method is and remains the indispensable tool, appropriate to our minds, for all exact research in any field whatsoever";67 it is logically indisputable, and eliminates the naïve assumptions of axioms as fundamental truths. "But now it is a question of something even more important," namely, to achieve "full clarity about the principles of inference in mathematics" by means of an appropriate axiomatization of logic itself. Then he highlighted the essential role of extra-logical discrete objects, namely signs or symbols, which allow a proof to be surveyed in all its parts. Possible contradictions in which mathematical thought may get entangled no longer need an intricate discursive process to be discovered, they will result, instead, in an erroneous constellation of signs. Like Leonardo's painting, Hilbert's proof theory does not ground its effectiveness on words, but on "visual evidence" (virtù visiva):68 "A proof is a figure, which we must be able to view as such."69 The further step that is required in building the axiomatic system of logic is spotted by Paul Bernays: Just as he [Hilbert] had formerly stripped the basic relations and axioms of geometry of their intuitive content, he now eliminates the intellectual content of the inference from the proofs.70
Whereas in the case of geometry the axiomatic procedure consists of projecting the edifice of geometry on to its formal layout, now projecting itself needs to be projected in order "to be surveyed in all its parts." Now what is at issue is "a strict formalization of the entire mathematical theory, inclusive of its proofs, so that -following the example of the logical calculus -the mathematical inferences and definitions become a formal part of the edifice of mathematics."71 The systems of formulas that represent mathematical proofs in a logical calculus must be detached from their contents, and become the immediate object of study. Once what is specifically mathematical is separated from everything contentual, in Bernays' words, . . . the sphere of the mathematical-abstract, into which the methods of thought of mathematics translate all that is theoretically comprehensible, is not that of the contentual-logical (inhaltlich Logisches) but rather that of the domain of pure formalism. Mathematics turns out to be the general theory of formalism, and by understanding it as such, its universal meaning also becomes clear.72
Here Hilbert's vision on mathematics reaches its highest point. In the meantime, on the way of painting, three notably moments bespeak the artists' awakening in the realm of ideality. Reading the Albertian perspective with non-Euclidean lenses, Paul Cézanne let the horizon come close to the picture plane and affect its layout ( Figure 5 ). Turning a Leonardesque view towards the Orient, Claude Monet let shadows set additional veils between the painter's eye and the scene. And Kazimir Malevich's Black Square (1913) ultimately closes the Alberti's window. Re-presentation was not an issue any longer.
Projections from Infinity
Seeking a conclusive proof theory, Hilbert's dream was to yield "the logical miracle that is grounded at the very essence of mathematics: the question of the infinite would be made accessible to finite resolution, to resolution through finite processes."73 As an artist rather than a theologian, in his lecture On the Infinite he appealed to the method of ideal element for clarifying the issue. The method, he noticed, is already used in the elementary geometry of the plane; there, "the introduction of ideal elements, namely, points at infinity and a line at infinity, renders the proposition according to which two straight lines always intersect each other in one and only one point universally valid."74 It is also used in algebra where propositions concerning numerals are cast in formulas, "which themselves are concrete objects [expressions composed of letters] that in their turn are considered by our perceptual intuition, and the derivation of one formula from another in accordance with certain rules takes the place of the number-theoretic proof based on content."75 Now Hilbert's goal was to take a picture of mathematics as "an inventory of formulas," thereby ensuring that logical operations can be applied to the ideal propositions, as they are applied to the finitary propositions. Here he took a further step into the ideal. The logical operations themselves were to be formalized by means of the logical calculus. And, since the formulas of the logical calculus are also ideal propositions, even the logical signs were to be divested of all meaning:
. . . contentual inference is replaced by manipulation of signs (äußeres Handeln) according to rules, and in this way the full transition from a naïve to a formal treatment is now accomplished, on the one hand, for the axioms themselves, which originally were naïvely taken to be fundamental truths . . ., and, on the other for the logical calculus, which originally was to be only another language.76
If axioms themselves, which are the building blocks of mathematics, are no longer fundamental truths but instruments for establishing connections, like shadows, the distinctive character of mathematics is not retained in its objects but in its method. And through the method of ideal elements, as Cassirer insists, mathematics is guided to take one step further along the original stream of its concept formation:
An increasing logical comprehension can be appreciated in all of those fields where ideal elements play a significant role. A case in point is given by the discovery of the 'imaginary' in mathematics and the various attempts that have been made to justify it logically. A new form of reasoning propagates itself from the theory of algebraic equations, through projective geometry, and physics.77
Like Alberti, Hilbert has devised an architectural vista of mathematics. Seeing mathematics in perspective, the point he made was neither to encompass the observable horizon within mathematics, nor to draw mathematics from experience, but rather to be mindful about the boundaries and instruments of mathematical thought. As he insisted:
In mathematics, as in any scientific research, we find two tendencies present. On the one hand, the tendency toward abstraction seeks to crystallize the logical relations inherent in the maze of material that is being studied, and to correlate the material in a systematic and orderly manner. On the other hand, the tendency toward intuitive understanding fosters a more immediate grasp of the objects one studies, a live rapport with them, so to speak, which stresses the concrete meaning of their relations.78 This passage encourages placing Hilbert's ideal perspective on mathematics at the confluence of Dedekind's "abstract mathematics" and Klein's "visual mathematics." Smoking the essence of continuity out of cuts, Dedekind has crystallized the logical relations inherent in the real numbers; grounding the "intuitive understanding" of geometry on transformation groups, Klein has captured the concrete meaning of invariant relations. Turning again to the infinite in his Königsberg address in 1930, Hilbert described it as a gigantic abstraction because "it is the negation of a condition that prevails everywhere."79 A few months later in Hamburg, he mentioned the sentence "The nothing is the absolute negation of the allness of being"80 as instructive for illustrating "all of the principal offences against the principles" underlying his proof theory.81 As he highlighted, concepts such as "the allness of being" contain a contradiction in themselves. The author of the sentence was Martin Heidegger who, in his address "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), had admonished science for not taking nothingness seriously: "Only because nothingness is manifest can science make what is itself into an object of investigation." Leaving aside the bulk of Heidegger's metaphysical argument whose aim was to show that the Critique of Pure Reason was not concerned with mathematical knowledge,82 a passage may deserve some attention: "Nothingness is the source of negation, not vice versa. If the power of the understanding in the field of questions concerning nothingness and being is thus broken, then the fate of the dominion of 'logic' within philosophy is also decided therewith." By reading "the allness of being" as "the allness of the actual infinite," Hilbert was definitely right for its negation makes no sense. On the other hand, the above passage may help decipher the key role of the gap in the "separationparticipation" process which triggers mathematical thought. A pair of "distinct objects" -be it being-nothingness, true-false, or even yin-yang -is needed to grasp the negation as a logical operation.
In the Kantian tradition, Hilbert endowed mathematics with the power of connecting theory and experience. And the infinite, he remarked, reveals the first connection between nature and thought: it neither occurs in nature nor is admissible as a foundation in our thought without special precautions. Then a significant parallelism between nature and thought lies in proceeding from unity and seeking to form unity. As he claimed:
We can understand this agreement between nature and thought, between experience and theory, only if we take into account both the formal element and the mechanism that is connected with it; and we must do this both for nature and for our understanding.83
Nevertheless, the ideal continuous ray (lineamentum) from experience to thought, and vice versa, cannot be "contracted" into the finite steps of a formal, mechanical process. The ideal projection of the observed object onto its abstract representation requires a gap. And the gap cannot be bridged because the two entities have a different nature; in fact, if they merged with one another, the projection would cease to exist. As a consequence, the cut, which assigns specular properties -minor-major, left-right, concrete-abstract, real-imaginary -to the parts involved, does not apply to the ideal ray; it is the ideal itself. In other words, the logical thought, which moves one image to fit on the other makes "explicit" the mirror symmetry of the visio intellectualis. Therefore, it cannot proceed "from unity." With hindsight, the sophisticated attempt to draw a formal mechanism from the ideal ray was bound to fail; there is no way through the mirror.
Ironic as it may seem, a further example of the pre-established harmony, which Hilbert detected at the roots of mathematical sciences, stems from the finitist matrix shared by his proof theory and quantum theory of measurement. While his conception of mathematics as a general theory of forms was brought to light "in the most splendid way" by Einstein's gravitational theory -which entwines its roots with those of geometry -84 Hilbert, similar to Cardano in a very broad sense, was reluctant to accommodate the architecture of quantum theory in his complex spaces. Still, quantum theory developed in Göttingen, and the kernel of its measurement problem lies in the finite resolution of the continuous wave function. Quantum observables require a "real screen" where to be projected on and an "ideal ray" that takes action on the projection. While the "uncertainty principle" rules the game of parts between the observables, a continuity principle demands complex numbers to fix the rules.85 As in Dedekind's analysis, it is again a requirement for continuity that brings about 83 Hilbert, "Logic and the Knowledge of Nature," 1160. the mirror symmetry between the parts involved. As in Hilbert's construction, the ideal building cannot fix its internal consistency.
Conclusion
Firmitas, utilitas, and venustas (construction, function and beauty of the design) are the building blocks of Alberti's system.86 Accordingly, the system requires a four dimensional space to take form: either the dynamical spacetime where the inventum is set, or the hypercomplex space spanned by ideal rays. Whereas quantum theory dwells in the Hilbert space spanned by complex rays, the architecture of the twentieth century has sought a new definition of the space by questioning the interior-exterior barrier and the function of the separating planes. Indeed, as the architect Alberti realized, the art of building germinates in the picture plane but flourishes in space. Departing from painting, the ideal view propagates through projective planes. Therefore, a higher level of abstraction is needed to grasp its meaning. Here is, most likely, the "vanishing point" where artistic and mathematical visions intersect each other anew. Yet, art and mathematics have exchanged their leading roles. While in Renaissance Europe "it was artistic 'vision' that first championed the rights of scientific abstraction and paved the way for it,"87 in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was mathematics that took abstraction to its limits and raised the ideal forms on to a higher space.
Among modern artists, Theo van Doesburg and Piet Mondrian sharpened the modes of "abstractism" with remarkable lucidity (Figure 4, right) . On the one hand, following the neoplasticism movement and De Stijl the fourdimensional decomposition of space became an invariant of modern architectural language; on the other hand, the "space-temporal painting" placed the observer within the picture rather than in front of it. As with Alberti, painting acted as a function of the space and surface as the fundamental element of architecture. Here, the ultimate step into abstraction let the surface become semi-transparent. Working with steel and plate glass, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe realized that, besides the game of light and shade, what was crucial for the definition of space was the game of reflections.88 His Crown Hall in Chicago provides an astonishing example of what can be achieved by combining construction, functionality and elegance: the essence of simplicity. Moreover, Mies' vision of the art of building may foster a comparison with the sense of space typical of traditional Japanese architecture and painting (see Figure 4 ). In contrast with the "converging perspective" of Renaissance Europe, the "parallel perspective," which prevails amongst the classical paintings of China and Japan, absorbs "projections from infinity."89
The passage from Alberti's De re aedificatoria quoted above is preceded by the following lines:
But how congenial and instructive the desire and thought for building may be to our minds is evident -if only because you will never find anyone who is not eager to build something, as soon as he has the means to do so; nor is there anyone who, on making some discovery in the art of building, would not gladly and willingly offer and broadcast his advice for general use, as if compelled to do so by nature.90
Coming from the Orient or from Plato's cave, the theatre of shadows took hold of the artist's mind. Eager to build something similar, painters, architects, and scientists could not help hunting for the structure of shadows' magic. By contrast, according to a Japanese legend, painting arose from the reflection of the moon in a pool. Coming from the infinity, the image of the moon in a pool does not kindle the desire of embracing it, nor of building something similar.91 When it reaches the artist's eye, the geometry that it suggests is not projective but "affine." It does not make the observer eager to take control of the rules of the game; taking pleasure in the beauty of the design is the ultimate goal. 
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